Aristotles Metaphysics Θ 1–3: On the Essence and Actuality of Force (Studies in Continental Thought)
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Part 2 then repeats wiederholt the interpretation of Greek conceptuality with the aim of retrieving wieder-holen ; lit. Heidegger has often been criticized for the violence his interpretation does to ancient texts, and rightly so. For example, scholars such as Yfantis have pointed out his immense debt to Luther. We thus have every reason to thank the translators for undertaking a translation of one of the most major Heidegger works to be published in recent years and Indiana University Press for making two of the three critical parts of this project available in translation.
The translation is mostly good, barring some errors.
Aristotle's Metaphysics 1–3: On the Essence and Actuality of Force by Martin Heidegger
This essay has now been reprinted in M. Bryn Mawr Classical Review Metcalf and Mark B. Studies in Continental Thought. ISBN Sociological theorists, most notably George Herbert Mead and Erving Goffman , saw the Cartesian Other as a "Generalized Other", the imaginary audience that individuals use when thinking about the self.
According to Mead, "we do not assume there is a self to begin with. Self is not presupposed as a stuff out of which the world arises. Rather, the self arises in the world". Schools of subjectivism , objectivism and relativism existed at various times in the 20th century, and the postmodernists and body philosophers tried to reframe all these questions in terms of bodies taking some specific action in an environment. This relied to a great degree on insights derived from scientific research into animals taking instinctive action in natural and artificial settings—as studied by biology , ecology ,  and cognitive science.
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The processes by which bodies related to environments became of great concern, and the idea of being itself became difficult to really define. Others, mostly philosophers, tried to dig into the word and its usage. Martin Heidegger distinguished human being as existence from the being of things in the world. Heidegger proposes that our way of being human and the way the world is for us are cast historically through a fundamental ontological questioning. These fundamental ontological categories provide the basis for communication in an age: a horizon of unspoken and seemingly unquestionable background meanings, such as human beings understood unquestioningly as subjects and other entities understood unquestioningly as objects.
Because these basic ontological meanings both generate and are regenerated in everyday interactions, the locus of our way of being in a historical epoch is the communicative event of language in use. Some philosophers suggest that the question of "What is? One might readily catch on that this person simply calls a 'cup' a 'chair' and the oddity is explained. The question of What is? Hirsch interprets Hilary Putnam as asserting that different concepts of "the existence of something" can be correct. Common to all Indo-European copula languages is the double use of the verb "to be" in both stating that entity X exists "X is.
It is sometimes argued that a third use is also distinct, stating that X is a member of a class "X is a C". In other language families these roles may have completely different verbs and are less likely to be confused with one another. For example they might say something like "the car has redness" rather than "the car is red". Hence any discussion of "being" in Indo-European language philosophy may need to make distinctions between these senses.
In human geography there are two types of ontology: small "o" which accounts for the practical orientation, describing functions of being a part of the group, thought to oversimplify and ignore key activities.
The other "o", or big "O", systematically, logically, and rationally describes the essential characteristics and universal traits. This concept relates closely to Plato's view that the human mind can only perceive a bigger world if they continue to live within the confines of their "caves". However, in spite of the differences, ontology relies on the symbolic agreements among members.
That said, ontology is crucial for the axiomatic language frameworks. According to A. Whitehead , for ontology, it is useful to distinguish the terms 'reality' and 'actuality'. In this view, an 'actual entity' has a philosophical status of fundamental ontological priority, while a 'real entity' is one which may be actual, or may derive its reality from its logical relation to some actual entity or entities.
For example, an occasion in the life of Socrates is an actual entity. But Socrates' being a man does not make 'man' an actual entity, because it refers indeterminately to many actual entities, such as several occasions in the life of Socrates, and also to several occasions in the lives of Alcibiades, and of others. But the notion of man is real; it derives its reality from its reference to those many actual occasions, each of which is an actual entity. An actual occasion is a concrete entity, while terms such as 'man' are abstractions from many concrete relevant entities.
According to Whitehead, an actual entity must earn its philosophical status of fundamental ontological priority by satisfying several philosophical criteria, as follows. Whitehead proposed that his notion of an occasion of experience satisfies the criteria for its status as the philosophically preferred definition of an actual entity.
From a purely logical point of view, each occasion of experience has in full measure the characters of both objective and subjective reality. Subjectivity and objectivity refer to different aspects of an occasion of experience, and in no way do they exclude each other.
Aristotle's substances, such as Socrates, have behind them as more fundamental the 'primary substances', and in this sense do not satisfy Whitehead's criteria. Whitehead is not happy with Leibniz' monads as actual entities because they are "windowless" and do not cause each other.
States of affairs are contingent on particulars, and therefore have something behind them. Another summary, referring to its causal linkage to other actual entities, is that it is "all window", in contrast with Leibniz' windowless monads. This view allows philosophical entities other than actual entities to really exist, but not as fundamentally and primarily factual or causally efficacious; they have existence as abstractions, with reality only derived from their reference to actual entities. A Whiteheadian actual entity has a unique and completely definite place and time.
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Whiteheadian abstractions are not so tightly defined in time and place, and in the extreme, some are timeless and placeless, or 'eternal' entities. All abstractions have logical or conceptual rather than efficacious existence; their lack of definite time does not make them unreal if they refer to actual entities. Whitehead calls this 'the ontological principle'.
There is an established and long philosophical history of the concept of atoms as microscopic physical objects. They are far too small to be visible to the naked eye.
It was as recent as the nineteenth century that precise estimates of the sizes of putative physical atoms began to become plausible. Almost direct empirical observation of atomic effects was due to the theoretical investigation of Brownian motion by Albert Einstein in the very early twentieth century. But even then, the real existence of atoms was debated by some. Such debate might be labeled 'microcosmic ontology'. Here the word 'microcosm' is used to indicate a physical world of small entities, such as for example atoms.
Subatomic particles are usually considered to be much smaller than atoms. Their real or actual existence may be very difficult to demonstrate empirically. Reasonably, one may ask, in what sense, if any, do virtual particles exist as physical entities? For atomic and subatomic particles, difficult questions arise, such as do they possess a precise position, or a precise momentum? A question that continues to be controversial is 'to what kind of physical thing, if any, does the quantum mechanical wave function refer?
In the Western Christian tradition, in his work Proslogion , Anselm of Canterbury proposed what is known as 'the ontological argument' for the existence of God. He suggested that, if the greatest possible being exists in the mind, it must also exist in reality. If it only exists in the mind, then an even greater being must be possible—one which exists both in the mind and in reality. Therefore, this greatest possible being must exist in reality.
Descartes published several variations of his argument, each of which centred on the idea that God's existence is immediately inferable from a "clear and distinct" idea of a supremely perfect being. In the early eighteenth century, Gottfried Leibniz augmented Descartes' ideas in an attempt to prove that a "supremely perfect" being is a coherent concept. Norman Malcolm revived the ontological argument in when he located a second, stronger ontological argument in Anselm's work; Alvin Plantinga challenged this argument and proposed an alternative, based on modal logic.
Attempts have also been made to validate Anselm's proof using an automated theorem prover. Other arguments for God's existence have been advanced, including those made by Islamic philosophers Mulla Sadra and Allama Tabatabai. Jaakko Hintikka puts the view that a useful explication of the notion of existence is in the words "one can find", implicitly in some world or universe of discourse.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. This article is about ontology in philosophy. For the concept in information science and computing, see Ontology information science. Not to be confused with Oncology , Odontology , Ontogeny , or Deontology. This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources.
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September Learn how and when to remove this template message. Main article: Ontological pluralism. Main article: Ontological argument. Abhidharma Applied ontology Foundation ontology Geopolitical ontology Guerrilla ontology Hauntology Holism Living educational theory Mereology Metamodeling Modal logic Monadology Nihilism Ontological paradox Philosophy of mathematics Philosophy of science Philosophy of space and time Physical ontology Porphyrian tree Quantum ontology Solipsism Speculative realism Structure and agency Subject—object problem.
Online Etymology Dictionary. Yearbook of the History of the Metaphysics , 9, , pp. Penn State Press.
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Cooke, Harvard U. In Vesselin Petrov ed. Ontos Verlag. Retrieved Contributions to Social Ontology.